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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

1

Plaintiff/Appellee,

ii

v.

\

FRANK EDWARD PHARRIS,

It

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No.

890549-CA

Priority No.

2

i

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of retail theft, a
third degree felony, after a plea of guilty in the Third Judicial
District Court.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Whether defendant attacks his plea on different

grounds than raised below, or in the alternative, whether the
record as a whole establishes that the defendant entered his
guilty plea with full understanding of his rights?

It is not an

abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea if the record as a whole establishes that
the plea was voluntary.

Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1149

(Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 751 (1990).
Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1987).

State v.

2.

Whether defendant failed to raise the issue below,

or in the alternative, whether the prosecutor complied with the
plea agreement?

It is not an abuse of discretion for the trial

court to deny a motion to withdraw a plea if the record supports
the judge's findings that the State fulfilled its plea bargain
promise.

See State v. Copelandf 765 P.2d 1266, 1273-75 (Utah

1988).
3.

Whether the trial court properly reinstated

defendant's guilty plea and required defendant to show "good
cause" to withdraw his plea as required by Utah Code Ann. § 7 7 13-6 (1990)?

A trial court's finding of fact regarding "good

cause" to withdraw a guilty plea will not be set aside unless it
is clearly erroneous.

Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah

1989).
4.

Whether Judge Moffat properly found that defendant

did not establish "good cause" to withdraw his guilty plea?

A

trial court's finding of fact regarding "good cause" to withdraw
a guilty plea will not be set aside unless it is clearly
erroneous.

Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989).
5.

Whether Judge Moffat sentenced defendant based on

misinformation?

It is an abuse of discretion to sentence a

defendant based on missinformation of a constitutional magnitude.
See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 445 (1972), State v.
Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707, 708 (Utah 1986).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The relevant provisions relied upon by the State are
set forth in the argument section of the brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with retail theft, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-602(1) (Supp. 1989)
(R. 6). Defendant pled guilty as charged on August 8, 1989, in
the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County,
the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, Judge, presiding (R. 27-33, T.
3-5).

Judge Moffat sentenced defendant to serve a term of zero

to five (0-5) years in the Utah State Prison to run concurrently
with an unrelated sentence (R. 36, T. 10-11).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 1, 1989, defendant walked into a Sears
Department Store, picked up a VCR, and carried it outside the
store without paying for it (R. 6-7, 27-33).

Defendant was

stopped in the parking lot with the VCR in his possession and
2
arrested (R. 6-7).
Defendant's trial was set for August 8, 1989 (R. 25).
On that day, defendant agreed to enter a plea of guilty in return
for the State not opposing a motion that defendant be sentenced
one degree lower than provided by statute (R. 27, T. 2). At the
change of plea hearing, Judge Moffat questioned defendant
regarding the plea (T. 3-5). He asked defendant if his name was
correct; whether defendant had gone over his statement with his
The official court record has been designated HR." (e.g. R. 1).
The transcript from the hearings on August 8 and 9, 1989 have
been designated W T. W (e.g. T. 1).
2
Defendant states that no record of facts exists and relies on
the criminal information for his Statement of Facts. However, a
full preliminary hearing was held on April 13, 1989 (R. 3). The
transcript from the preliminary hearing has not been made part of
the record on appeal.

attorney; whether defendant was under the influence of drugs or
alcohol; whether defendant was threatened or promised anything
other than the plea bargain itself; and whether defendant was
acting freely and of his own volition (T. 3). Defendant
responded appropriately. Id.
Judge Moffat then told defendant he was entitled "to
certain constitutional protections" including the right to trial
by jury; the right to confront witnesses; and the right to force
the state to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt (T. 3-4).
The judge also advised defendant that by pleading guilty he was
waiving those constitutional rights and that he was also waiving
"other valuable constitutional rights" (T. 4). Defendant
acknowledged that he understood his waiver and was willing to do
so.

Id.
Judge Moffat then asked defendant if he had any

questions he wanted to ask either the court or his attorney. Id.
Defendant said "No." ^d.

The judge then asked defendant if he

knew the possible penalties for a third degree felony and whether
defendant's attorney had told him of the penalties.
answered "Yes."

Defendant

Judge Moffat emphasized that he was not bound by

the sentencing recommendations made by either the state or the
defense and that he could impose either concurrent or consecutive
sentences (T. 4-5).
Only then did Judge Moffat ask defendant if he wanted
to change his previous plea of not guilty (T. 5). Defendant
entered a plea of guilty and Judge Moffat declared that
defendant's plea was entered voluntarily and knowingly after
being informed of his rights. Id.
-4-

Defendant waived the two-day minimum time for
sentencing and requested that he be sentenced immediately (T. 56).

Defendant's attorney, Andrew Valdez, asked for leniency in

sentencing (T. 5-10).

The Deputy County Attorney, Walter Ellett,

accurately described defendant's criminal record (T. 7-8). Mr.
Ellett did not oppose defendant's motion to reduce the offense
one degree or defendant's request to allow the sentence to run
concurrently with defendant's other sentence. I^i. Judge Moffat
rejected defendant's motion to reduce the sentence one degree,
and sentenced defendant to serve zero to five years concurrently
with his other sentence (R. 36, T. 10-11).
Immediately after sentence was imposed, defendant moved
to withdraw his guilty plea and requested that he proceed to
trial (T. 11). Defendant's attorney stated that unless his
client received some sort of concession for pleading guilty as
charged, it was a disservice to his client to not go to trial.
Judge Moffat granted defendant's motion and set trial for the
next day. Id.
The next morning, Judge Moffat reversed his decision
from the previous day and reimposed the guilty plea explaining
that no -good cause" was shown for withdrawing the guilty plea
(T. 12). The judge then invited defendant to establish good
cause to withdraw the guilty plea. I^i. Mr. Valdez pointed to the
State'8 willingness not to oppose sentencing defendant to a class
"A" misdemeanor. IdL.

He mentioned the amount of time defendant

had been incarcerated since his arrest and the circumstances
surrounding defendant's release and subsequent arrest (T. 13-15).

Mr. Valdez also spoke of defendant's need for a halfway house (T.
14-17).

Mr. Ellett briefly explained that defendant was released

from prison in 1980, was sent back to prison in 1986, and
released on intensive supervision parole in February of 1989 (T.
17).

Mr. Valdez then made a final argument that he had

ineffectively represented defendant by indicating to defendant
that there was a good chance that his sentence would be reduced
to a class WA" misdemeanor (T. 18).
Judge Moffat stated that he had clearly articulated to
defendant that the court was not bound by the recommendations of
either the State or the defense (T. 18). He pointed out that
while the State did not oppose the motion to reduce the sentence,
the State did not join in that motion (T. 18-19).

He then found

that defendant's disappointment with his sentence was not "good
cause" to allow defendant to renege on his guilty plea (T. 19).
Defendant's sentence as previously imposed was allowed to stand
(T. 19-20).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Defendant should not be permitted to raise different
grounds on appeal for invalidating his guilty plea than he raised
in the court below.

In any event, defendant's plea was knowingly

and voluntarily entered where the court ensured that defendant
knew of the various rights he waived by pleading guilty to the
offense charged.

The court made a detailed inquiry into whether

defendant's plea was voluntary, giving both defendant and defense
counsel an opportunity to either ask questions or place
objections in the record.

The judge made sure that the record as

a whole# including the plea affidavit, comported with Rule 11 of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The record as whole

indicates that defendant knew what rights he was relinquishing
and that defendant voluntarily relinquished them, including the
rights to protect himself against self-incrimination, to know the
nature and elements of the offense, and to know minimum and
maximum sentences.

Defendant's reliance on a strict compliance

test is misplaced where the Utah Supreme Court has continued to
apply a record as a whole test.
Because defendant did not object below, he should not
be allowed to argue now that the prosecutor violated the terms of
the plea agreement.

Had defendant objected below, the judge

could have fashioned a remedy.

Instead, defendant made a

tactical decision to go forward and only objects now because the
judge denied a subsequent motion to reduce sentence.

Even if

defendant is allowed to raise this issue for the first time on
appeal, the prosecutor complied with the plea agreement.

The two

comments now brought into question by defendant were made in
response to questions by the judge.

Both comments were

statements of fact already in the record, neither rose to the
level of argument or advocacy.
Defendant also objects because the judge initially
allowed him to withdraw his guilty plea, but after further
reflection, reversed his previous ruling and let the guilty plea
stand.

The judge ruled that in order for him to allow withdrawal

of a guilty plea, he had to find "good cause."
invited defendant to show good cause.

The judge then

When defendant failed to

do so to the judge's satisfaction, the judge denied the motion to
withdraw the plea.

Defendant makes his argument without support

of legal authority on the theory that because the prosecutor did
not object, the judge acted improperly.

Since motions to

withdraw guilty pleas are within the sound discretion of the
judge, defendant has not shown the judge abused his discretion,
nor has defendant shown that the judge violated the norms of
judicial neutrality or participated in the plea process.
Next, defendant objects because the judge refused to
allow him to withdraw his guilty plea after defense counsel
attempted to show "good cause."

Defendant claims that his

dissatisfaction with the sentence created "good cause" for the
judge to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea.

Post-sentencing

buyer's remorse does not demonstrate good cause.
Finally, defendant claims the judge relied on
misinformation in imposing sentence.

Defendant infers that the

judge sentenced him on the mistaken belief that defendant's crime
was drug related.

However, when read in context, the judge's

remarks do not establish that he believed defendant's current
crime was drug related.

Instead, the judge was simply commenting

on defendant's criminal history and the seriousness of theft
crimes in general.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT CANNOT ATTACK HIS GUILTY PLEA ON
DIFFERENT GROUNDS THAN RAISED BELOW, OR IN
THE ALTERNATIVE, DEFENDANT'S PLEA WAS
VOLUNTARY.
Defendant claims that his guilty plea was not
voluntarily entered because the trial court did not explicitly
articulate the various rights defendant waived by pleading
guilty.

Defendant's claim is without merit and should be

rejected.
Initially, defendant's claim should be rejected for his
failure to raise his claim in the trial court below.

This Court

should not entertain an attack on a guilty plea first raised on
appeal in the absence of exceptional circumstances or plain
error.

State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987).

While

defendant did request leave of the trial court to withdraw his
plea, defendant did not claim that his plea was involuntary or
that he did not understand his constitutional rights.

Instead,

defendant claimed that his plea should be withdrawn because he
was disappointed with the sentence.

Defendant had ample

opportunity to raise his claims below and should not be permitted
to create new issues on appeal.
Notably, defendant's appellate counsel, Andrew Valdez,
also represented defendant at the guilty plea hearing.

Counsel

did not raise any concerns about the validity of the plea in the
trial court.

In fact, counsel signed a statement that he

believed defendant fully understood the meaning of the plea
agreement.

The statement reads as follows:

I certify that I am the attorney for Frank
PharriB, the defendant above, and that I know
he has read the statement or that I have read
it to him and I have discussed it with him
and believe that he fully understands the
meaning of its contents and is mentally and
physically competent. To the best of my
knowledge and belief after an appropriate
investigation, the elements of the crime(s)
and the factual synopsis of the defendant's
criminal conduct are correctly stated and
these, along with the other representations
and declarations made by the defendant in the
foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true.
(Signed) Andrew Valdez/ Attorney for
Defendant
(R. 32) (See Exhibit "A"; Statement of Defendant).
It seems obvious that defendant now wants to renege on
the plea agreement because Judge Moffat refused to sentence
defendant to a class "A" misdemeanor.

On appeal, defendant's

counsel contradicts his previous certification that the guilty
plea was knowingly entered and now argues that defendant did not
fully understand the plea.

This sudden shift in position is

nothing more than "buyer's remorse" on the part of defendant in
an attempt to escape the result of his plea.
Cook, 759 P.2d 341, 342 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

See Summers v.
Tactics like these

were denounced by the Utah Supreme Court when it said, "[i]f we
were to hold that any violation of Rule 11 automatically voids
the resultant plea, even when the plea is knowingly and
voluntarily entered, we would encourage defendants, convicted and
sentenced after such a plea, to attack their convictions for
purely tactical reasons. . . ."
1301 (Utah 1986).

State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294,

Such tactics should not be countenanced by

this Court.

_i n_

In any event, Judge Moffat did not abuse his discretion
in denying defendant's request to withdraw his guilty plea.

Rule

11(5) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure sets forth the
procedures to be followed in entering a guilty pleat
(5) The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty or no contest, and may not accept the
plea until the court has found:
(a) if the defendant i6 not represented by
counsel, he has knowingly waived his right to
counsel and does not desire counsel;
(b) the plea is voluntarily made;
(c) the defendant knows he has rights
against compulsory self-incrimination/ to a
jury trial/ and to confront and cross-examine
in open court the witnesses against him, and
that by entering the plea he waives all of
those rights;
(d) the defendant understands the nature
and elements of the offense to which he is
entering the plea; that upon trial the
prosecution would have the burden of proving
each of those elements beyond a reasonable
doubt; and that the plea is an admission of
all those elements;
(e) the defendant knows the minimum and
maximum sentence that may be imposed upon him
for each offense to which a plea is entered/
including the possibility of the imposition
of consecutive sentences;
(f) if the tendered plea is a result of
prior plea discussion and plea agreement/ and
if so, what agreement has been reached; and
(g) the defendant has been advised of the
time limits for filing any motion to withdraw
a plea of guilty or no contest.
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(5).3
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing
to comply with the strict standards of Rule 11 as follows:

(1)

the court did not inform defendant of hi6 right against selfIn 1989/ the subsections in Utah R. Crim. P. 11 and Utah Code
Ann. S 77-35-11 were redesignated so that former Rule 11(e) and
S 77-35-ll(e) are now Rule 11(5) and S 77-35-11(5). See 1989
Utah Laws, Ch. 62/ S 2. Section 77-35-11 is repealed effective
July 1/ 1990. See Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-11 (Supp. 1989).

incrimination; (2) the court did not ensure that defendant
understood the nature and elements of the offense and that a
guilty plea was an admission of those elements; and (3) the court
did not ensure that defendant knew the minimum and maximum
sentence possible. (Br. of App. at 8).
Defendant maintains that 6trict# and not just
substantial, compliance with Rule 11 is required and failure to
comply with the requirements of Rule 11 necessitates setting
aside the guilty plea.

Defendant relies on State v. Gibbons, 740

P.2d 1308, 1313 (Utah 1987), where the Utah Supreme Court stated
that "Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of
ensuring that constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are
complied with when a guilty plea is entered." Ld. at 1312.
Defendant also relies on this Court's opinions in State
v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) and State v.
Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Although these

cases stand for the proposition that strict and not just
substantial compliance with Rule 11 is required in all postGibbons cases, they are inconsistent with recent Utah Supreme
Court rulings and should not be followed.
Recently, in Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148 (Utah
1989), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 751 (1990), the Utah Supreme
Court found that although the trial judge did not strictly comply
with Rule 11 when Jolivet entered his plea,
*[T)he absence of a finding under [section
77-35-11} is not critical so long as the
record as a whole affirmatively establishes
that the defendant entered his plea with full
knowledge and understanding of its
consequences and of the rights he was
-i ?-

waiving." State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403,405
(Utah 1986); Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310,
311 (Utah 1985); Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d
309, 310 (Utah 1985).
784 P.2d at 1149-50.
Decided prior to Jolivet, State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d
1266 (Utah 1988), also applies the record as a whole test.

The

Copeland court said:
The United States Supreme Court has said,
"[TJhere is no adequate substitute for
demonstrating in the record at the time the
plea is entered the defendant's understanding
of the nature of the charge against him."
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. [459,]
470 . . . . (emphasis in the original). We
think the most effective way to do this is to
have a defendant state in his own words his
understanding of the offense and the actions
which make him guilty of the offense. By
this statement, the trial court can assure
itself that the defendant is truly submitting
a voluntary and knowing plea. Moreover, the
record on appeal will clearly reflect the
defendant's understanding. Although this
method is therefore preferable to others, it
is not absolutely required. The test is
voluntariness.
765 P.2d at 1273 (emphasis added).
Scrutinizing Gibbons reveals that the Court was
recommending the best method of determining the voluntariness of
a plea, not imposing a "strict compliance" test.

Copeland

clearly states that strict Rule 11 compliance is not absolutely
required when a guilty plea is otherwise voluntary.

Thus,

substantial compliance is sufficient where the record establishes
that the defendant pled voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently.

See also State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 1301-02

(Utah 1986) (technical Rule 11 violations do not automatically
invalidate an otherwise voluntary plea).

In State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296, 1301 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989), this Court applied the record as a whole test to a
post-Gibbons guilty plea citing to, inter alia, Copeland, Jolivet
and Kay.

Thurston did not acknowledge either Vasilacopulos or

Valencia, nor cite to Gibbons. Apparently, at least one panel of
this Court has abandoned the strict compliance rule articulated
in Vasilacopulos and Valencia.

As stated above, the test is

whether the record as a whole establishes that the plea was
entered "with full knowledge and understanding of its
consequences, and the rights [defendant] is waiving."

Thurston,

781 P.2d at 1301.
It may be argued that Copeland and Jolivet represent
cases where the Supreme Court was applying the record as a whole
test only because the pleas were entered before Gibbons was
decided.

This argument gains some support from the Court's

recent refusal to apply Gibbons to a pre-Gibbons plea on the
theory that the Gibbons decision was a clear break with the past
and consequently not retroactive.

See State v. Hickman, 779 P.2d

670, 672, n.l (Utah 1989) .
Hickman, although troublesome, is not controlling when
closely analyzed.

First, it is a per curiam decision.

Second,

it ignores that the Court applied the record as a whole test in
Jolivet after stating the Gibbons requirements but without
distinguishing the case on the basis that it was a pre-Gibbons
plea.

The Court did not even cite Gibbons in Copeland, thus,

indicating no concern that Gibbons was inconsistent with its
holding.

Notably, the Court does not even state the date of

Jolivet's plea and mentions only in passing the date of
Copeiand'B plea without assigning any particular significance to
the date.

The Court's willingness to apply the record as a whole

test in Jolivet and Copeland without further explanation
indicates that the only test is voluntariness, not strict
compliance with rigid Rule 11 recitations.

Were it otherwise, it

is likely that the Court would have overruled Miller, Kay,
Brooks, and Warner; or at least have expressly limited their
application to pre-Gibbons cases. The Court simply has done
neither and this Court should reconsider its rigid application of
a strict Rule 11 compliance standard with this line of cases in
mind.
Applying the record as a whole standard, the trial
judge committed no error in accepting defendant's guilty plea.
Before accepting the guilty plea, the trial judge and defendant
entered into the following colloquy:
The Court: Allright (sic).
and correct name?

Mr. Pharris is your true

A.

Yes.

Q.

Have you gone over the Defendant's statement with
your attorney?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you read and understand the English language?

A.

Yes

Q.

Are you currently acting under the influence of any
drug or alcohol?

A.

No.

Q.

Have you been promised anything other than the plea
bargain itself or have you been threatened in any
way which would cause you to enter this plea
bargain?

No.
Are you do doing so freely and of your own
volition?
Yes.
Allright (sic). Now, you're entitled to certain
constitutional protections; you're entitled to a
trial with a jury, if you wish it, you're entitled
to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against
you, you're entitled to require the State to prove
the charges against you beyond a reasonable doubt
and you're entitled to appeal if you were found
guilty. If you sign this plea bargain here today
and enter a plea of guilty, you're waiving these
constitutional rights; you're also waiving other
valuable constitutional rights. Are you aware of
that?
Yes.
You willing to do that?
Yes.
Allright (sic). Do you have any questions about
this matter that you would like to ask of your
attorney or of the Court?
No.
Are you aware of the possible penalties that can be
imposed for a third degree felony? Has your
attorney told you what the possible penalties are?
Yes.
Allright (sic). And are you aware that in matters
of sentencing anything having to do with the
sentence that may be imposed, that any
recommendations made by either State or by your
attorney to the Court, are not binding on the Court
and that I can sentence in anyway (Bic) that's
consistent with law; are you aware of that?
I am aware of that, yes.
Allright (sic). And are you aware, that any
sentence that may be imposed, can be made to run
consecutively; that is, end to end with any
sentence that you're currently serving or currently
serving only one charge here.

A.

I am aware.

Q.

Are you# at this time, prepared to enter a plea?

A.

Yes.

Q.

How then do charge to Count One, retail theft, a
Third Degree Felony?

A.

Guilty.

The Court: Allright (sic). If you wish to, you can
sign the Defendant's Statement; and the Court finds
that the Defendant entered a Plea of Guilty voluntarily
and knowingly, after he had been advised of his rights,
which he understands.
The Court: Are both the Prosecution and Defense
counsel satisfied with the contents of the affidavit?
Mr. Ellett:

Yes, State is, Your Honor.

Mr. Valdez:

Yes, Sir.

(T. 3-5). Based on this discussion, defendant argues that the
trial court reversibly erred by failing to orally discuss with
defendant on the record three Rule 11 requirements.
A.

RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION.

Defendant correctly notes that the trial judge did not
verbally tell him that a guilty plea serves as a waiver of his
right against self-incrimination.

Under the record as a whole

standard, however, this does not mandate vacating defendant's
guilty plea.

See Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d 309, 310 (Utah

1985); Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310, 311 (Utah 1985).
While the trial judge never verbally asked about selfincrimination, the record does indicate that defendant knew of
this right.

Paragraph seven of the plea affidavit states, "I

know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf but if I
choose not do so I can not be compelled to testify or give

evidence against myself and no adverse inferences will be drawn
against me if I do not testify."
Statement of Defendant).

(R. 29) (see Appendix WA";

Defendant acknowledged to Judge Moffat

that he read this statement (T. 3). Additionally, this was
defendant's sixth appearance before a court on various criminal
charges (R. 9-13).

The record affirmatively shows that defendant

knew of his right against self-incrimination and the affidavit
affirmatively indicates that defendant waived it.

Had either

defendant or counsel had any concern with the waiver of this
right as indicated in the affidavit, either one could have
objected prior to signing it.
B.

Neither did.

NATURE AND ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE.

Defendant also objects to the fact that the trial court
did not verbally apprise him of the nature and elements of the
offense.

Defendant points out that Gibbons says, "There is no

adequate substitute for demonstrating in the record at the time
the plea is entered the defendant's understanding of the nature
of the charges against him."

Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313 (quoting

McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 470 (1969)) (emphasis in
original).

On the other hand, Copeland states that although this

is the preferred method, "it is not absolutely required."
Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1273.
Once again, applying the record as a whole test,
defendant had ample opportunity to hear and understand the nature
and elements of the offense.

The record indicates that a

preliminary hearing was held April 13, 1989, although the
transcript from that hearing is not part of the record (R. 3).

At the preliminary hearing, the State demonstrated probable cause
in order to bind defendant over for trial. A preliminary hearing
necessarily includes a recitation of the nature and elements of
the offense of retail theft.
Additionally, the plea affidavit itself indicates
defendant knew the nature and elements of the crime.

Defendant

states, "I did take possession of merchandise on display for sale
at a mercantile establishment with the intent to permanently
deprive the merchant thereof.

Value was over $250 but less than

$1,000. . • . I attempted to take a VCR from Sears Department
Store" (R. 28) (see Appendix "A"; Statement of Defendant).

Where

defendant had a preliminary hearing and signed a plea affidavit
detailing the elements of the offense, it should be concluded
that the record shows that defendant received notice of the
nature and elements of the crime for which he pled guilty.
C.

MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM POSSIBLE SENTENCES.

Defendant next complains that the trial judge did not
apprise him of the minimum and maximum sentences for the crime.
This claim should also be rejected.
The transcript indicates that the trial court did
ensure that defendant knew the penalties possible.

The following

exchange took place:
Q.

Are you aware of the possible penalties that can be
imposed for a Third Degree felony? Has your
attorney told you what the penalties are?

A.

Yes.

(T. 4). While the judge asked two questions and defendant gave
only one response, his "Yes" response to either question would

affirmatively indicate he knew of the possible penalties.
Defendant does not claim that his counsel ineffectively informed
4
him of the penalties for a third degree felony.

If defendant

were answering the second question, one can assume that his
attorney did not misinform him about possible punishments for
that degree of offense.
The record further indicates that defendant knew the
penalties.

Under the notations of CRIME, DEGREE, and PUNISHMENT

(min/max), respectively, the statement of defendant notes, in
handwritten script, "Theft, 3rd Degree, 0-5" (R. 27) (see
Appendix "AM; Statement of Defendant).

Underneath the "0-5" in

the Punishment column are the handwritten symbols, "$0 - 5,000."
Beneath this handwritten note is the agreement that the "State
will not oppose sentencing as a Class A misdemeanor (sic)." Id.
"0-5" obviously indicates a length of time.

While it does not

have the word Hyears" following it, as an inmate at the Utah
State Prison and a person with a high school equivalency degree,
defendant would know that "0-5" represents years, not months,
days, hours, or seconds.
Finally, it should be noted that this was defendant's
second conviction for retail theft (R. 9). Defendant had also
been convicted of another third degree felony, conspiracy to
commit robbery (R. 10). The entirely of the plea bargain
agreement was an attempt to reduce the amount of time to be
The State assumes that the defense counsel informed defendant
of the actual penalties for a third degree felony. Otherwise,
defense counsel is admitting by his argument that he violated
several tenets of the Rules of Professional Conduct, including
Rules 1.1, 1.4, and 2.1.
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served*

Consequently, the record shows that defendant was aware

of the penalty for a third degree felony.
POINT II
DEFENDANT FAILED TO RAISE THE ISSUE BELOW, OR
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE PROSECUTOR DID NOT
VIOLATE THE PLEA BARGAIN AGREEMENT.
Defendant claims the prosecutor's comments at the plea
hearing were so prejudicial that the prosecutor violated the plea
bargain.

As previously noted, the Supreme Court has long held

that it will not entertain an issue raised for the first time on
appeal absent "exceptional circumstances or plain error."
v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987).

State

See also State v.

Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 581 (Utah 1983); State v. Steggell, 660
P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983).

Defendant makes no assertion that his

claim is either exceptional or plain error.

Instead, defendant

argues that the contemporaneous objection rule would be
ineffective in this case since there would be no opportunity for
the trial judge to correct defects in an efficient and dignified
manner.

(Br. of App. at 14).
Defense counsel did not object at the time of the plea

change, even though an objection would have put the trial judge
on notice that the prosecutor was allegedly violating the terms
of the plea agreement.

If the trial judge found that the

prosecutor had violated the terms of the plea bargain, the trial
judge could have vacated the guilty plea, ordered a presentencing report despite defendant's desire to be sentenced that
day, or fashioned some other remedy.

For defendant to argue that

no objection was required to preserve alleged prosecutor

misconduct for appeal does an injustice to the trial judge by
precluding him from creating a remedy for the alleged problem: a
remedy not requiring an appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals and a
possible remand for resentencing.
In any event, no violation or error occurred.

The

United States Supreme Court has established the standard for plea
bargain agreements.

Santobello v. New York, 404 U..S. 257 (1971).

In Santobello, the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor must keep
his promises contained in a plea agreement, l^d. at 262.
Violation of a plea bargain invalidates it.

See also State v.

West, 768 P.2d 891, 896 (Utah 1988) ("The nature of plea bargains
requires the exchange of consideration, allowing the parties
involved to reach a mutually desirable agreement.

A plea bargain

is a contractual relationship in which consideration is passed").
To support his claim, defendant cites State v.
Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1274 (Utah 1988), for the proposition
that a plea cannot be considered voluntary unless the defendant
has an accurate understanding of the commitment made to him in
the plea agreement.

Unfortunately for defendant, the facts in

Copeland bear no resemblance to defendant's case.
In Copeland, the Supreme Court stated that M[i]t is not
clear in this case what recommendation the State promised to
make." Ici. The Court remanded the case back to the district
court to determine the exact recommendation promised by the
State, defendant's understanding of that promise, and whether the
State fulfilled the promise. Id. at 1276.

In the current case, defendant clearly knew the
condition of the plea: the State would not object to defendant
being sentenced to a class "A" misdemeanor.

Defendant now

objects because the prosecutor, Walter Ellett, made two innocuous
statements in the record.

Both statements arose because the

trial judge asked the prosecutor if he had anything to add.

In

the first statement, he briefly restated defendant's criminal
record, information defendant concedes already existed in the
record (Br. of App. at 13) (R. 9-13).

In the second statement,

the prosecutor mentioned that defendant went to prison in 1980,
again in 1986, and was recently released on parole.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a trial court
would abuse its discretion to impose a sentence "in total
ignorance of the background of the defendant. . . ."
Carson, 597 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1979).

State v.

The Supreme Court also

stated that a trial court "'must be permitted to consider any and
all information that reasonably may bear on the proper sentence
for the particular defendant, given the crime committed.'"

State

v. Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707, 708 (Utah 1986) (quoting Wasman v.
United States, 468 U.S. 559, 575 (1984)).
In this case, defendant waived the two day minimum time
before sentencing (T. 5, 10). Defense counsel then made his
argument that defendant should be sentenced to a class "A"
misdemeanor instead of a third degree felony.

(T. 6-7). Defense

counsel stated that defendant had never been convicted of a crime
of violence (T. 7). At that point, the prosecutor, without
embellishment or advocacy, gave the trial judge a brief synopsis
of defendant'8 criminal record as follows:

Mr. Ellettt Let me give you some background
on the Defendant, BO you'll be aware of his
history, going back to 1979, when he was
convicted of retail theft, sentenced, and
fined, misdemeanor at that point in time. In
1980 and 1979 he was also convicted of
robbery and sentenced to the Utah State
Prison. He was paroled from the prison in
1981-1982, excuse me and that was revoked,
and he was then committed again to the Utah
State Prison and paroled in 1985; that was
revoked in September of '85 and then paroled
again in December of #85. Then in 1986,
convicted of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute and was
sentenced at that time to one to fifteen at
the Utah State Prison.
I assume, when he was placed out on that
is when this occurred and now been revoked
and back in prison to serve that term. So he
has a history from 1979 through here with one
robbery involved in it. And so he is not new
to the system. And so whatever the Court
wishes to do or consider, I think that should
be taken into consideration.
We would have no objection, Your Honor,
since Mr. Matheson talked to Mr. Valdez and
indicated he would not oppose the Court's
running concurrently, any sentence that is
imposed today with the sentence that he is
now set to serve at the Utah State Prison.
(T. 7-8)

Defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's

statements, instead he recounted defendant's criminal record and
deeds in a light favorable to defendant (T. 8-9). Mr. Ellett did
not speak again until after defense counsel moved to rescind
defendant's guilty plea (T. 11).
Defendant also complains of the prosecutor's comments
the next day.

The trial judge gave defense counsel an

opportunity to establish Mgood cause" to allow defendant to
withdraw his guilty plea (T. 12). Defense counsel recapitulated
his argument of the previous day and also argued that defendant's

crime was a cry for help at a system not prepared to help him
after his release from prison (T. 12-17).

After defense counsel

had done so, the trial judge asked Mr. Ellett if he wished to
comment (T. 17). Mr. Ellett factually recounted information
about defendant's parole as follows:
Mr. Elletti Only to advise the Court, that
my information is, that Mr. Pharris was
released from prison in 1980 and went back to
prison in 1986, and, as indicated was
released approximately the end of February of
this year and placed on intensive supervision
in the intensive supervision parole division
of A P and P. And aside from that, Your
Honor, I think we have all of the information
concerning Mr. Pharris.
(T. 17) I_d.

Once again, defense counsel did not object, even

though he had the opportunity.
As the record indicates, nothing the prosecutor said
was in violation of the plea bargain.
record in a neutral manner.

He merely clarified the

Defendant's real complaint is that

Judge Moffat, who had previously indicated he was not bound by
the plea agreement, sentenced defendant to a third degree felony
(R. 36, T. 4, 10). It is also of note that the plea bargain, as
articulated by the prosecutor, defense counsel, the trial judge,
and the statement of defendant was that the State would not
oppose defendant being sentenced to a class "A" misdemeanor (R,
27, T. 2, 12). Significantly, as the trial judge noted, this is
not an agreement for the State to support the defense motion for
a reduced sentence, it is merely a promise not to oppose a
reduced sentence (T. 17). The prosecutor never opposed defense
counsel at any stage.

Thus, no error occurred.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REINSTATED THE GUILTY PLEA.
Defendant next argues that Judge Moffat acted
improperly by reinstating defendant's guilty plea after allowing
defendant to withdraw it the previous day.

A review of the facts

demonstrates that defendant's claim is spurious.
On August 8, 1989, after Judge Moffat pronounced
sentence, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea and stand
trial (T. 11). Judge Moffat initially agreed. IdL

The next

morning, Judge Moffat reversed his previous ruling and reinstated
defendant's guilty plea (T. 12). He said he was doing so because
the statute requires "good cause" for withdrawal of guilty pleas.
See Utah Code Ann. S 77-13-6 (1990) ("A plea of guilty . . . may
be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and by leave of the
court").
After reversing his previous ruling, Judge Moffat
invited defense counsel to show "good cause" for withdrawal of
the guilty plea (T. 12). Defense counsel argued that good cause
existed because the state did not oppose sentencing defendant to
a class "A" misdemeanor, defendant had spent time in prison since
his arrest, defendant requested placement in a halfway house when
he was released from prison, and defendant committed the crime
was as a cry for help (T. 14). Defense counsel also tried to
imply that he had promised defendant that he would be sentenced
to a class "A" misdemeanor. (T. 18). Judge Moffat refused to
entertain that argument, reminding defense counsel that he, the
judge, had already stated that he was not bound by any

recommendation from either the prosecutor or defense c&* .->1 (T.
18-19) • Judge Moffat made a determination that defendant did not
show good cause (T. 18-20)
It is interesting to note that defendant cites no legal
authority for his argument.

Instead, defendant claims good cause

existed because the State did not oppose the reduction of his
sentence, the judge refused to reduce the sentence.

Defendant's

argument reduces the "good cause" requirement of Utah Code Ann. S
77-13-6 to little more than an expedient way to evade a court
ruling defendant does not like, in this case, the trial judge
denying a motion to sentence defendant to a lower level of crime.
Analogously, the Utah Supreme Court has held that Ma
presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea should, in general,
be liberally granted."

State v. Galleqos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1042

(Utah 1987) (emphasis added).

However, the Gallegos court also

said the rationale for allowing withdrawal of a guilty plea is to
permit the defendant to "undo a plea which was unknowingly,
unintelligently, or involuntarily made." Id.

at 1041.

In this case, defendant wished to undo a guilty plea
after sentencing because of the sentence imposed by the trial
Judge.

This is neither "good cause,M nor a case of a plea

-unknowingly, unintelligently, or involuntarily made."

Because

defendant's motion came after sentencing, the liberal Galleqos
standard is inapplicable.

Withdrawal of guilty pleas after

sentencing is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Id.
The trial court did not err in reversing its previous ruling and
putting defendant to the burden of establishing good cause to
withdraw the plea.
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Defendant also claims that Judge Moffat acted
arbitrarily by reinstating the guilty plea.

He argues that the

judge violated his duty to act in a neutral manner.

Evidently,

defendant believes that the judge impulsively set aside his
earlier ruling which allowed defendant to withdraw his guilty
plea.

Simply because the judge reversed his prior ruling sua

sponte does not indicate arbitrariness nor create reversible
error.

Judge Moffat clearly explained that he reversed his prior

ruling because he had not applied the statutory "good cause"
test.
Defendant cites State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986)
in support of his claim.

In Kay, the Supreme Court held that a

trial judge should not engage in plea negotiations. Ld. at 12991300.

Defendant correctly describes the "evil" p€»rpetuated when

a trial judge actively participates in the plea process.
However, Judge Moffat did not participate in the plea bargain.
Judge Moffat listened to defense counsel argue that
defendant should be sentenced to a class "A" misdemeanor instead
of a third degree felony and evidently found the argument
unpersuasive.

At no point did Judge Moffat make any statement

which could be construed as attempting to participate in the plea
bargain process.

After sentencing defendant, Judge Moffat

quickly granted defendant's motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
Upon reflection, and obviously after his own review of the law,
Judge Moffat correctly decided that the plain meaning of the
statute required defendant to establish "good cause- to withdraw
his guilty plea.

Instead of acting imperiously, Judge Moffat

then gave defense counsel an opportunity to show good caut_.
Only when defense counsel did not meet this burden did Judge
Moffat deny defendant's motion.

Judge Moffat'6 actions were not

arbitrary, but instead followed the statutory procedures and good
cause standard for withdrawing a guilty plea.

POINT IV
JUDGE MOFFAT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
REQUEST TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA.
Defendant argues that Judge Moffat abused his
discretion in finding that defendant did not establish good cause
to withdraw hi6 plea.

This argument deserves little attention.

When asked to establish good cause, defendant's counsel
reiterated defendant's disappointment with his sentence (T. 1217).

Counsel argued that the circumstances of the case justified

a lower sentence ^d.

Counsel did not claim any deficiency in the

entry of the plea.
As stated above, defendant's dissatisfaction with his
sentence does not establish good cause.

Defendant's post-

sentencing buyer's remorse is not sufficient grounds to allow
defendant to escape the result of his plea.

See Summers v. Cook,

759 P.2d 341, 342 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Defendant cites State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040 (Utah
1987).

However, Gallegos is easily distinguishable from

defendant's case.

As Gallegos states, "A presentence motion to

withdraw a guilty plea should, in general, be liberally granted."
Id. at 1042 (emphasis added).

Here, defendant explicitly stated

his desire to be sentenced the same day as his plea, waiving the

statutory waiting period (T. 2, 5-6, 10). Defendant hoped the
trial judge would sentence him to a class NA" misdemeanor and
wanted expedited sentencing.

He only complains because Judge

Moffat, in his sound discretion, rejected the defense motion to
sentence defendant to a misdemeanor.

Since defendant did not

attempt to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing, Galleqos does
not apply.
POINT V
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT SENTENCE DEFENDANT
BASED ON MISINFORMATION.
Finally, defendant alleges that Judge Moffat refused to
sentence him to a class "A" misdemeanor because of improper
reliance on material misinformation.

He claims it is a due

process violation to base a sentence on misinformation of a
constitutional magnitude.

See State v. Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707,

708 (Utah 1986); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S, 443, 445
(1972)-

Defendant bases his claim on two statements by the trial

judge.

In the first statement, Judge Moffat said, "Well the drug

crimes are just horrendous.-

(T. 7). In the second instance,

Judge Moffat said:
The Court is deeply concerned that in
the situation we find ourselves today, the
largest number of crimes, including crimes of
thi6 nature, are created because of drug
problems. While I may not feel as offended
by somebody stealing a vcr from Sears, as
they steal them from a home, it happens both
ways and being done for the same, exact
reasons. And I just can't feel that I can
Again, defendant did not raise this issue below thus permiting
Judge Moffat to rule on the matter. Accordingly, defendant
should not be permitted to raise the issue for the first time on
appeal. State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983).

send a message to the Board that says that I
think that this individual ought to be
treated lightly, simply by reason of the fact
the vcr was less than $250 and not even sure
that'8 a very good measurement of the basis
upon the differentiations for sentencing.
But that's what we're talking about, with
what our legislature has done. But I think
that the time has come and needs to be done.
That we have got to get serious about people
who cannot keep their hands off things that
don't belong to them.
So the motion to sentence as a Class A
Misdemeanor is denied. The sentence of the
Court is that the Defendant, Frank Edward
Pharris, be incarcerated in the Utah State
Prison for the indeterminate sentence
provided for by law of zero to five years. I
will allow that to run concurrently with his
present sentence.
(T. 10-11).
Defendant asserts that these two statements indicate
that Judge Moffat thought defendant's crime was drug related and
therefore sentenced him based on misinformation.

A careful

reading of the transcript shows that defendant has taken the
first statement out of context.

Just prior to the first

statement, defense counsel was discussing, as part of his
argument for a reduced sentence, the fact that defendant was on
parole for a drug crime and that drug crimes are not crimes of
violence (T. 7). A reasonable reading of the record would
indicate that Judge Moffat commented because he considered drug
crimes to be horrendous, notwithstanding defense counsel's
statement.
When he made the second comment, Judge Moffat was in
the process of sentencing defendant.

Since defense counsel had

made defendant's prior criminal record a basis for his argument
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for a reduced sentence, and defendant had a prior conviction for
a drug related crime, the judge could properly address defense
counsel's argument in his sentencing remarks to defendant.
Neither party contended this offense was drug related.

Judge

Moffat, recognizing defendant's prior conviction, commented that
many thefts are drug related.

He did not state that he had

information that the instant crime was drug related.
Significantly, defendant does not cite to any
misinformation relied upon by Judge Moffat.

Instead, defendant

merely infers misinformation based upon his interpretation of
Judge Moffat's comments.

It is readily apparent that Judge

Moffat's statement was nothing more than a commentary on the
criminal justice system in response to defense counsel's attempt
to minimize the seriousness of defendant's present crime and past
criminal history.

This commentary does not establish that Judge

Moffat's sentencing decision was tainted by the consideration of
misinformation.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State requests that
defendant's conviction and sentence be affirmed.
DATED this

May, 1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAN R. LARSEN
Assistant Attorney General
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APPENDIX

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

TCJ

T h u d Juci v,,^; L/Jic^-

JUDICIAL METRIC

R&TO989

STATE OF UTAH
By

i^.

£&.
.•-.!'/ C-,.V

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT

v.

Jri£*dc

/£

Criminal No.

Defendant.
COMES NOW,

<f®t(j£

/V/Lfthe defendant in this

case and hereby acknowledges and certifies the following:
I have entered a plea of (guilty) (no contest) to the
following crime(s):

PSgraq

CPIME
,.

\

^
^

PUNISHMENT (Min/Max)

^ _

^

^

B.

C.

D..

I

have

received

a copy of Wie"^tchargj}) (information)

against me, I have read it, and I understand the nature and
elements of the offense(s) for which I am pleading (guilty) (no
contest).

The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as
follows:

1

/AJLM

/jih^r ou*4 &£#

/fLc/~J&*s y4A*w *0<r&&

My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I
am

criminally

liable,

that

constitutes

the

elements

of

the

crime(s) charged are as follows:

4*

-JtcA* au^Z£

I

am

entering

this/these

-^m

plea(s)

S&*

voluntarily

and

with

knowledge and understanding of the following facts:
1.

I know that I have the right to be represented by an

attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be
appointed by the court at no cost to me.
2.

^"Oiave^^jaetr? (have) waived my right to counsel.

have waived

my

intelligently

right
and

to

counsel,

voluntarily

I have
because

done
of

If I

so

knowingly,

the

following

reasons:

3.
this

If I have waived

statement

charges,

my

my

and understand

rights

in

this

right

to counsel,

the nature
and

consequences of my plea of guilty.

other

I have read

and elements of the
proceedings

and

the

If II haire not waived my right to counsel/ my attorney

4.

mi

discuss

this

statement/

my

and I have had an opportunity to
rights

and the consequences of my

guilty plea with my attorney.
5.

I know that I have a right to a trial by jury.

6.

I know that

if I wish to have

a trial

I have the

right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to
have them cross-examined by my attorney.

I also

know that I

have the right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense
to testify in court upon my behalf.
7.

I know

that

I have

a right

to testify

in my own

behalf but if I choose not to do so I can not be compelled to
testify

or

give

evidence

against

myself

and

no

adverse

inferences will be drawn against me if I do not testify.
8.

I know that if I wish to contest the charge against

me I need only plead "not guilty" and the matter will be set
for trial/ at which time the State of Utah will have the burden
of

proving

doubt.

If

each
the

element
trial

of

is

the

before

charge

beyond

a

the

jury

a

reasonable

verdict

must

be

unanimous.
9.

I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I

were tried and convicted by a jury or by the judge that I would
have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah
Court

of Appeals

ox,

where

allowed/

to the Supreme Court of

Utah and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such
appeal/ those costs would be paid by the state.
10.

I know

that

the maximum

possible

sentence may be

imposed upon my plea of guilty/ and that sentence may be for a

- 3 -

prison term# fine, or both.
tine,

a

surcharge,

63-63-9, will be imposed.

I know that in addition to any
required

by Utah Code Annotated

I also know that I may be ordered by

the court to make restitution to any victim or victims of my
crimes.
11.

I know

that

imprisonment

may be for consecutive

periods, or the fine for additional amounts, if my plea is to
more than one charge.

I also know that if I am on probation,

parole or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I
have been convicted or to which I have pleaded guilty, my plea
in the present action may result in consecutive sentences being
^*^^\

imposed upon me.
12.

I know and understand that by pleadin<ft guilty^ (no

contest) I am waiving my statutory and constitutional rights
set out

in the preceding

paragraphs.

I also know

that by

entering such plea(s) I am admitting and do so admit that I
have committed

the conduct

alleged

and

I am guilty

of the

crime(s) for which my plea(s) is/are entered.
13.
result

My plea(s) of/(guilty)y (no contest) is/is not the

of a plea bargain between myself and the prosecuting

attorney.
bargain,

The promises, duties and provisions of this plea
if any,

are fully contained in the Plea Agreement

attached to this affidavit.
14.

I know that any charge or sentencing concession or

recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a
reduction

of

the

charges

for

sentencing

either defense counsel or the prosecuting
binding

on

the judge.

I also know that
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made or sought by
attorney

are not

any opinions they

express to me as to what they believe the court may do are also
not binding on the court.
15.

No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any

kind have been made to induce me to plead

guilty,

promises except, those contained

in the attached

herein

and

and no

plea agreement, have been made to me.
16.

I have read this statement or I have had it read to

me by my attorney, and I understand its provisions.

I know

that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this
affidavit.

I do not wish to make any changes because all of

the statements are correct.
17.

I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my

attorney.
18.
through

I am

^

the

^•rade""~and I can read and understand the

English language.
medication

years of age; I have attended school

or

I was not under the influence of any drugs,

intoxicants

plea(s) was made.

when

the

decision

to

enter

the

I am not presently under the influence of

any drugs, medication or intoxicants.
19.

I believe myself to be of a sound and discerning

mind, mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the
consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease, defect
or

impairment

that

would

prevent

me

from

knowingly,

intelligently and voluntarily enteripg my plea.
DATED this

(3 '

dav of

F^^O-z^
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19.

' "7\

CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney fo
the defendant

above,

and

that

statement

or

that

I have

discussed

it

with^niny/her

I know(jhe^he

read

it

and

to (him/her

believe

after

an

and

I have

that</^5e/she

understands the meaning of its contents and
physically competent.

has read the

fully

is mentally and

To the best of my knowledge and belief

appropriate

investigation,

the

elements

of

the

crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal
conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the other
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the
foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true,

meyCERTIFICATE OF FftOSEOUTING ATTORNEY
I certify that I anrttreN^attorney for the State of Utah in
the case against«—/"j/c^t^N ^ f y ^ f O ^
reviewed

this statement

declarations,

including

, defendant.

of the defendant
the

elements

I have

and find that the

of the offense of the

charge(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal
conduct which constitutes the offense are true and correct.

No

improper inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea
have been offered defendant.

The plea negotiations are fully

contained in the statement and in the attached plea agreement
or

as

supplemented

on

record

before

the

court.

There is

reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the
conviction

of

defendant

for

the

- 6 -

offense(s)

for

which

the

plea(s)

is/are

entered

and

acceptance of the plea(s) would

serve the public interest.

ORDER
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement
and

certification,

the

court

finds the defendant's plea of

guilty is freely and voluntarily made and it is so ordered that
the defendant's plea of (guilty) (no contest) to the charge(s)
entered.
set forth in the statement be^accepted and entered.
DONE IN COURT this

C

dav

Gts/jU^t^Ss?

